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Blaming everything on encryption is a recurring event. Whenever
something bad happens that the intelligence services have no control
over, it's because the encryption is at fault.
The latest outcry against it was UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd's take on What's Ups end-to-end encryption arguing that Britain’s intelligence services must have:
adding to the voices supporting the weakening of encryption or the
planting of backdoors to popular consumer-level applications.
In stark contradiction to the Home Secretary's fruitless political talk, consider the position of ENISA, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, and the centre of network and information security expertise for the member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. This was outlined in its December 2016 essay on its recommendations on cryptography in the context of proposals to reduce its strength in order to facilitate interception and decryption of communications by the Security Services and strongly advices against any such weakening.
Its key findings are a mix of legal and technical aspects:
The latest outcry against it was UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd's take on What's Ups end-to-end encryption arguing that Britain’s intelligence services must have:
“the ability to get into situations like encrypted WhatsApp”
In stark contradiction to the Home Secretary's fruitless political talk, consider the position of ENISA, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, and the centre of network and information security expertise for the member states, the private sector and Europe’s citizens. This was outlined in its December 2016 essay on its recommendations on cryptography in the context of proposals to reduce its strength in order to facilitate interception and decryption of communications by the Security Services and strongly advices against any such weakening.
Its key findings are a mix of legal and technical aspects:
- The use of backdoors in cryptography is not a solution. Existing legitimate users are put at risk by the very existence of backdoors. The wrong people are punished.
- Backdoors do not address the challenge of accessing of decrypting material because criminals can already develop and use their own cryptographic tools.
- Judicial oversight may not be a perfect solution as different interpretations of the legislation may occur.
- Law Enforcement solutions need to be identified without the use of backdoors and key escrow. It is very difficult to restrict technical innovation using legislation.
- History has shown that technology beats legislation and criminals are best placed to capitalise on this opportunity.
- The perception that backdoors and key escrow exist can potentially affect and undermine the aspirations for a full embraced Digital Society in Europe.
- History has shown that Legal Controls are not always successful and may harm and inhibit innovation.
- The experience in the US that limiting the strength of encryption tools inhibited innovation and left the competitive advantage in this area with other jurisdictions.
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